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In a competitive environment the maximization of self-interest and the 
minimization of the other's interest can be seen as the two faces of the 
same coin. However, these motivations can lead to very different 
behaviors. In order to understand how these are expressed, we designed 
an experiment to measure the ability of children and teenagers to react to 
stimuli that induce behavior to act as a rational player (maximization of 
self interest) or as a spiteful player (minimization of other's interest). 
Each player faced the following dilemma: maximizing pay-off and 
incurring the risk of having a lower pay-off; or alternatively guaranteeing 
one’s own pay-off was not smaller than the opponent’s pay-off. A prize 
was attributed proportionally to the pay-off (Treatment 1) or to the player 
with highest pay-off (Treatment 2), which meant that the optimal 
behavior was different for each treatment. We performed experiments 
with 398 Portuguese children and teenagers and found evidence that 
younger children tended to be maximizers (in both variants) and that 
teenagers tended towards rational behavior when it was best for them and 
towards spiteful behavior when the latter was more advantageous.  
 
There are many ways to be competitive (as there are many ways to be 
cooperative, too). The most studied one, both theoretically and 
empirically, is called “rationality” (maximization of self-interest). The 
term rationality traditionally refers to individuals acting towards the 
maximization of their own selfish interests, measured by the “pay-off” 
concept originally introduced in game theory (Neumann, & Morgenstern, 
2004; Tversky, Kahneman, 1986). In a sense, one compares his/her fate 
in all possible scenarios and chooses the best possible outcome. 
However, in most real situations of experimental interest, people compete 
against each other. Taking as an example an experimental game, where 
each of two individuals has two strategic possibilities and pay-off 
functions associated with all possible combinations, a simple 
maximization of one's pay-off says nothing about the effect of this 
decision to the direct competitor's pay-off. If a strategic decision 
maximizes one's pay-off but results in an even higher pay-off for the 
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opponent, then this may be a wrong decision in an environment of direct 
competition. In fact, mathematical models along these lines are 
considered the starting point of the studies of cooperation, as the benefit 
of one is also a benefit for the other (Chalub, Santos, Pacheco, 2006; 
Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2005; Hamilton, 1970; Leimar, & 
Hammerstein, 2001; Santos, & Pacheco, 2005; Santos, Pacheco, & 
Lenaerts, 2006; Trivers, 1971). Evolutionary psychology has further 
explored this by studying the impact that neurological and emotional 
processes related to altruism and cooperation have on the survival and 
spread of individuals (Van Lange, 1999; Van Lange, Agnew, Harinck, & 
Steemers, 1997; de Wall, 1996).  
Defined as an act that causes loss of payoff (or any other type of cost) 
to the opponent, spite may be advantageous in a competitive scenario 
given certain precise conditions. We will not specify here the full set of 
conditions that make spite advantageous; we stress however, that 
rationality (maximization of own's payoff) and spite (minimization of 
other's payoff) are not mutually exclusive. 
Humans display many behaviors that could be classified as spiteful 
and spite is often linked with negative emotional responses to inequity 
such as envy and jealousy (Berke, 1988; Dufwenberg, & Güth 2000; 
Salovey, & Rothman 1991; Smith, 1991). Although apparently 
maladaptive, these behaviors are suited to certain competitive contexts. 
By comparing payoffs directly with another individual, one could be 
empowered with the means of assessing the best strategy for obtaining a 
payoff. Some authors have suggested that this would elicit an “out-
compete your neighbor” decision process that would allow exerting just 
the right amount of effort to succeed in outcompeting rivals (Hill & Buss, 
2008). In economics, the process of dumping (where a firm decreases the 
price of its product, possibly below cost price, intending to drive 
competitors out of the market) is such an example (Winters, 1991). 
Humans also commonly display what is known as “last-place aversion.” 
In this case individuals prefer to minimize the probability of being last 
(for example, in a ranking of income distribution), rather than 
maximizing their own pay-off (Kuziemko, Buell, Reich, & Norton, 
2011). Spiteful behavior has also been identified in a study where higher-
ranking individuals are more likely to spite lower ranking individuals 
than their similars (Fehr, Hoff & Kshetramade 2008). 
For this study, the starting point was to understand if the propensity 
for spiteful behavior was present in children along with the propensity 
for rationality, or if children displayed these propensities at different 
stages of their development, ultimately comparing the motivations and 
the ability of children and teenagers to react to stimuli that induced 
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behavior in one or the other direction. Namely, we wanted to quantify, 
according to age, the propensity for acting rationally or spitefully.  
The literature on studies of spite with children is very limited. 
Spiteful choices (as described above) were reported to appear 
spontaneously in about 22% of subjects between 3 to 6 years old in an 
anonymous ultimatum game (Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008) and 
appeared more often than chance at ages 5 to 8 in a face-to-face 
experiment designed to replicate studies of altruism in chimpanzees 
(House, Henrich, Brosnan, & Silk, 2012). Using the dictator game, other 
studies reported that younger children tended to be more selfish and that 
pro-social choices increased as children became older (Fehr, et al 2008; 
Harbaugh, Krause, & Liday, 2003; Hook, & Cook 1979). In the dictator 
game, the proponents were assumed to be interested in maximizing their 
own pay-off; however, their observed behavior frequently contradicted 
this assumption. One possible explanation was that participants took into 
account other's pay-offs (Camerer, 2003). This was confirmed by the 
studies of Benenson, Pascoe, and Radmore (2007) and Knight and Kagan 
(1977), where competitive behavior among children arose substantially 
by 9 years of age. It was suggested that children with better fluid 
cognitive skills were more likely to be spiteful (Bugelmayer & Spiess, 
2011). These findings were argued as likely related to the improvement 
in children’s ability of calculating proportionality (Kagan, & Madsden, 
1972; Streater, & Chertkoff 1976; Toda, Shinotsuka, Mcclintock, & 
Stech, 1978), a reasoning that is echoed in Piaget’s work on child 
developmental stages (Piaget, 1965).  
In this sense, the present study aimed at comparing strategic choices 
in children within a competitive scenario. Unlike most studies that 
focused on spite (Foster, Wenseleers, & Ratnieks, 2001) and compare 
this behavior with that of altruism, we intended to compare it in a 
competitive environment where the other choice was to be rational, in the 
sense of pay-off maximization. For that effect, we presented a face-to-
face game to assess how children behaved competitively when presented 
with the following dilemma: (i) maximizing pay-off and incurring in the 
risk of having a pay-off lower than the opponent, or (ii) deciding not to 
maximize pay-off while, on the other hand, guaranteeing that it is not 
smaller than the opponent’s pay-off. The game was presented in two 
treatments. In the first one (A), a prize was given to both players, 
proportional to their accumulated pay-off; in the second one (B), a prize 
was given to the player with the highest pay-off. Therefore, the optimal 
strategy was different in each treatment; in the first case the rational 
strategy maximized the expected value of the prize, while, in the second, 
this was obtained by the spiteful strategy.  
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Psychological research on motivation tends to be made via eliciting 
responses from subjects to questions raised by researchers. Despite this, 
economics research tells us that individuals might not be properly 
motivated to provide accurate responses without material incentives (Fan, 
2000). In this sense, the stimuli for the children’s behavior, spiteful or 
rational, in our experiment, was assumed to be a consequence of the 
material incentive (although its monetary value was largely symbolic). 
The game was designed such that rational players would choose the 
maximizing strategy; nonetheless, they risked having a pay-off lower 
than that of the opponent. Alternatively, spiteful players would choose 
the spiteful strategy, reducing their own payoff but still managing to 
reduce opponent’s payoff even more. We expected that players would 
learn the best strategy and converge to the Nash equilibrium (Nash, 
1950) in Treatment A (both players playing rationally) and to the non-
Nash (spiteful) equilibrium (both players playing spitefully) in Treatment 
B, ultimately playing different strategies in Treatments A and B. We also 
predicted that older children would be better at devising the optimum 




Participants were 398 children from 5th to 11th grades from 6 different 
schools on the island of São Miguel in the Azores Archipelago, Portugal. 
Grades 6, 9 and 11 were discarded from analysis because sample sizes 
were too small and grade 6 did not play one of the variants (we required a 
minimum of 15 sessions in each game in a given grade to consider it). 
After removing these participants from the sample, our study comprised 
350 children in 175 sessions, as each person participated only once (See 
Table 1 for descriptive frequencies). Each session was composed of a 5- 
round game. Columns represented player two’s strategy and the entry 
(a,b) indicated the result of the game: pay-off a for the first player and b 






  max min 
 
Player 1 max (15,15) (5,11) 
 
 min (11,5) (2,2) 
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TABLE 1   Descriptive frequencies. Frequencies Described Are  
                   After Participants Removal 
Treatment   Frequency Percent 
 A 178 50.9 
 B 172 49.1 
 Total 350 100 
Age       
 10 13 3.7 
 11 5 1.4 
 12 88 25.1 
 13 96 27.4 
 14 44 12.6 
 15 49 14 
 16 51 14.6 
 17 4 1.1 
 Total 350 100 
Grade       
 5th Grade 20 5.7 
 7th Grade 150 42.9 
 8th Grade 94 26.9 
 10th Grade 86 24.6 
 Total 350 100 
School       
 Ribeira Grande 258 73.7 
 Roberto Ivens 16 4.6 
 Laranjeiras 42 12 
 Lagoa 8 2.3 
 Antero de Quental 26 7.4 
  Total 350 100 
 
The participation of each student was strictly voluntary, but was 
presented to the students as an opportunity to develop a taste in 
mathematical and economical issues. The study was performed outside 
normal lecture period. No personal information was requested either 
from the students or teachers other than the date of the experiment, age 
and class year of the participants. To ensure that the children did not feel 
any pressure towards a certain action due to the presence of university 
researchers, we presented the teachers with the tools to perform the 
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experiments. For that purpose we gave the teachers of 6 schools a crash 
course in game theory history, economic experiments and the practical 
execution of our experimental protocol during March 2010. The 
schoolteachers then chose the appropriate date to run the experiments, 
which ranged from March to June, 2010.  
The experiment required 4 playing cards from two distinct decks, one 
with a red back and one with a black back which we designated as “Red” 
and “Black.”  Each player then received one “Red” and one “Black” 
card. These corresponded to max and min in our payoff matrix, 
respectively. It is important to note that the terminology “max” and “min” 
was never used during the training or during the experiments. In each 
class, the schoolteachers divided the children into two groups: A and B. 
Each of the pairs in these groups played the game corresponding to their 
group letter in the experiment for five rounds. After appointing each pair 
of children to their respective group, the teacher handed each of them a 
score sheet with the payoff matrix (which means students had access to it 
during the entire duration of the experiment). The following information 
was recorded on the score sheet: 
 
1. Ages of each participant;  
2. School year of each participant;  
3. What card was played by which student in rounds 1 through 5;  
4. Score of each student after each round and total score. 
 
After all students sat down, the teachers read the following 
information aloud and explained the procedure of the experiment out 
loud: 
 
• All players have the same rights and duties;  
• Each player receives one red and one black card 
– For group A: The prize will be proportional to the number of points 
obtained by each player at the end of the game. 
– for Group B: The prize will be given to the player with the highest 
score. 
 
1. Each player chooses either the Black or the Red strategy 
2. The referee requests the strategies be shown 
3. The referee records the participant’s strategies and resulting points in 
the provided experimentation score sheet. 
4. Items 1 to 3 are repeated an additional four times. 
5. After everyone in the class played, I will write the total scores for each 
Treatment in the blackboard and proceeded with awarding the prizes: 
 
• Group A: the prize will be given proportional to the points obtained 
by each player with 15 points equaling 1 piece of candy. 
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• Group B: the prize will be given to the player with the highest score. 
The payoff will be a high valued chocolate, in case of a tie, the chocolate 
will be divided among the two. 
After this information was provided and when there were no doubts 
regarding procedure of the experiment, the game began.  
 
Statistics 
We assumed the null hypothesis “players do not play differently in 
Treatments A and B” and calculated the probability P that this hypothesis 
was confirmed. We referred to the strategies of a given player in a given 
game by a number q in the interval [0,1], if, in that game, he/she played 
strategy max with probability q. Furthermore, we called NA the number 
of times that a given player played strategy max in Treatment A and NB 
the number of times the same player played strategy max in Treatment B. 
The total number of trials was given by N. (In this sense, he or she played 
strategies NA/N and NB/N, for games A and B, respectively.) 
In Treatment A, where the best strategy was given by the strategy 
q=1, the probability that an equal or better result was obtained with the 






For Treatment B, where q=0 gives the best strategy, the probability of 









The probability of having a better result in both Treatments is given 
by the product of FA and FB. Finally, we defined P as the maximum, over 
all possible values of q, of the product of FA and FB. Therefore, P was the 
maximum probability of attaining a result as good as or even better than 
the one observed using the same strategy for both Treatments.  
Next, we analyzed which strategies were being played in each 
Treatment to assess if children were trying to maximize the absolute or 
the relative pay-off (i.e., if they were playing as rational or spiteful 
players) and combined rounds to analyze differences in total min and max 
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plays between the two different Treatments. Afterwards, we ran Probit 
Regression analysis on each round as a dependent variable in order to 
understand whether children were making their decision based on their 
age, grade, school, previous rounds and payoffs. Finally, we ran the same 
analysis with relative payoffs to understand if children were considering 
their absolute or relative payoffs.  
 
RESULTS 
In our first analysis, the results showed seven significant cases, four 
of which with p < .01. 5th graders played different strategies in 
Treatments A and B in the first round; 8th graders played different 
strategies in rounds 1, 3 and 4 with a probability greater than chance and 
10th Graders played different strategies in rounds 1, 3 and 4 with a 
probability greater than chance (see Table 2). In Table 2 consider that 
players adopt the same strategy in both Treatments (null hypothesis). 
Here, we show maximum probability that, under the null hypothesis, a 
better result is obtained in both (note that it is always possible, under the 
null hypothesis, to obtain a better result in at least one Treatment). Bold 
text denotes significant results. Despite these results not showing which 
strategy was used for each Treatment, they suggested that older children 
understood better that each one induced strategic differences. 
 
TABLE 2  Binomial Cumulative Distribution for Both Treatments 
                  Simultaneously.  
  
Round 
1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 
5th Gr. 0.018 0.58 0.34 0.18 0.45 
7th Gr. 0.16 0.53 0.63 0.08 0.89 
8th Gr. 0.05 0.25 0.04 0.05 0.28 
10th Gr. 0.006 0.07 0.004 0.004 0.31 
 
We considered as our following question whether or not children 
were playing the correct strategy for each Treatment. Therefore, we 
computed the probability pA of playing optimum strategy max in 
Treatment A and probability pB of playing optimum strategy min in 
Treatment B (see Table 3). Here, 5th and 8th graders correctly played the 
max strategy in round 1 of Treatment A, but only 8th graders played the 
correct strategy min in round 3 of Treatment B. Children in the 10th grade 
played the correct strategy max in rounds 1 and 3 of Treatment A and the 
correct strategy min in round 4 of Treatment B. Results were not 
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conclusive, but indicated that rational behavior was more easily 
understood than spiteful behavior. 
 
TABLE 3 Probabilities of Playing Correct Strategy (max) in Treatment A 
                (pA) & Correct Strategy (min) in Treatment B (pB). Bold Text  
                Denotes Significant Results for Binomial Test of Each Game 
 
Grade Round pA pB 
5th 1 0.92 0.5 
8th 1 0.57 0.56 
 
3 0.5 0.64 
  4 0.57 0.56 
10th 1 0.77 0.45 
 3 0.7 0.55 
  4 0.57 0.76 
 
Our next set of results aimed at understanding which factors 
influenced the children’s decisions. For that effect, we calculated Probit 
regressions where each round was the dependent variable, followed by a 
Type III intercept model with Age, Grade and School as constant 
independent factors and each round adding the previous round and 
payoffs as factors.  
For Treatment A, we modeled min plays as the response category and 
max as the reference category. We found that for Round 1 of Treatment 
A, Age, Grade or School did not influence children’s min responses. In 
Round 2, Round 1 and Payoffs of Round 1 influenced children’s min 
responses (Round 1 Wald’s chi(1) = 7.949, P < 0.05 ; Payoff 1 Wald’s 
chi(1) = 3.611, P < 0.05). For Round 3 both Round 1 and Round 2 proved 
to influence children’s min responses, (Round 1 Wald’s chi(1) = 7.133, P 
< 0.05 ; Round 2 Wald’s chi(1) = 4.835, P < 0.05). For Round 4, payoffs 
of Round 1 and 2 influenced children’s min responses significantly 
(Payoff Round 2 Wald’s chi(1) = 12.032, P < 0.01 ; Payoff Round 2 
Wald’s chi(1) = 10.396, P < 0.01). Finally for Round 5, only min plays in 
Round 1 influenced children’s behavior (Wald’s chi(1) = 4.466, P < 0.05). 
For Treatment B, we used the same procedure but instead modeled 
max responses and min as reference category. Here, very few significant 
influences were found. For Round 1, we found an influence of Grade in 
the max responses to min plays (Wald’s chi(3) = 6.905, P < 0.05). In 
Round 3, School influenced the max responses (Wald’s chi(3) = 9.658, P 
< 0.05), however, this result can be readily explained by the skewness of 
the sample with one school clearly dominating. Round 4 presented an 
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influence of the Payoff of Round 1 in the max responses (Wald’s chi(3) = 
4.036, P < 0.05). 
After this analysis we considered only absolute and relative payoffs 
as our factors. Interestingly, the results were unexpected as Treatment A 
revealed that relative payoffs were a major influence in children’s 
decisions, especially in rounds 2 and 3 (see Table 4). 
 
TABLE 4  Treatment A Probit regression. Wald’s Chi Square and p  
                  Values for Relative & Absolute Payoffs with Rounds as DVs  
Dependent Factors 
Wald's Chi 
square df p 
Round 2 Rel. payoff Round 1 7.473 2 0.024 
Round 3 Rel. payoff Round 1 11.896 2 0.003 
 Rel. payoff Round 2 11.108 2 0.004 
Round 4 Abs. payoff Round 1 4.277 1 0.039 
Round 5 Rel. payoff Round 4 9.777 2 0.008 
 
For Treatment B on the other hand, only two significant results were 
obtained (Round 4 as dependent and Payoff of Round 1 as factor: Wald’s 
chi(1) = 7.171, p < 0.05; and Round 5 as dependent and Payoff of Round 
3 as factor Wald’s chi(1) = 3.988, p < 0.05).  
Finally, we wanted to determine the overall trend in min and max 
plays. For that effect we combined all rounds into a single variable and 
plotted a chart (Figure 1) that shows total min and max plays separated 
by Treatment and calculated binomial proportions to understand if the 
differences between max and min are significant. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
At first glance, our results showed that younger children did not 
understand that there were strategic differences in both our Treatments as 
overall they seemed to adopt the exact same strategy in both, despite not 
being in their own interest to do so; older children understood that both 
Treatments had different strategies. The data also pointed towards 
younger children (5th to 7th grade) tending to play rationally more than 
spitefully and teenagers (10th Graders)  tending towards rationality when 
it was best for them and for spiteful strategies when the latter were more 
advantageous. We also found that more children played max in Round 1 
of Treatment A then slowly reversed their strategy, and that fewer 
children started with min in Round 1 of Treatment B then slowly 
increased this strategy. However, Probit analysis revealed that spiteful 
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strategies were more common when they were not advantageous. This 
could mean that the children  perceived treatment  A across all grades as 
 
 
 FIGURE 1  All rounds combined max & min plays for Treatments A & 
  B.  
Note: Binomial tests Treatment A: max proportion = 0.56, min proportion =  0.44, P < 
0.001;Treatment B: max proportion = 0.48, min proportion =   0.52,  P n.s. 
 
 
a collaborative effort, and min responses triggered reciprocal behavior, 
maybe as punishment for a non-collaborative action or simply as a 
spiteful action, where a child preferred to win against the other at the cost 
of points that could result in fewer candies. In fact, we found similar 
patterns between what children played in our experiment and the strategy 
of win-stay lose-shift (Nowak & Sigmund 1993). Despite the max 
strategy being the rational one, probability of playing min in any Round 
was highly influenced by both min plays and payoffs of previous Rounds. 
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This effect could be explained by a feeling of envy towards the other 
player’s pay-off or some other effect that drove children to reduce the 
effective max plays after they started playing correctly. This explanation 
relates to previous findings that claim that socialization practices that 
affect human altruistic and competitive behavior impact at similar ages 
and that the circumstances that drive each of these behaviors are learned 
with age (Benenson, et al 2007). In Treatment B, grade was influential in 
the decision of playing max in the first round, meaning that older, more 
rational children were better at a competitive game than younger 
children. In this Treatment, reciprocal behavior was not observed apart 
from Round 4 with a minor influence from the Payoff of Round 1. 
In this context, children responded to other’s pay-offs in different 
ways in each Treatment. Inequity aversion played a bigger role in 
Treatment A, with children that had negative relative payoffs retaliating 
in the following rounds with spiteful strategies. Our results point toward 
spiteful preferences being present when children directly played against 
each other. Psychologically, spite is often linked with negative emotional 
responses to inequity such as envy (Ben-Ze'ev, 1992; Salovey, 1991; 
Smith, 1991). Envy and spite are negatively charged concepts that have 
been considered maladaptive (Hamilton, 1970; Hill & Buss, 2008). 
However, these responses to inequity might play an important role in 
human development. In this sense, spiteful participants could be better 
equipped to cope with competitive environments, especially when 
pitched against efficiency-minded and inequality-averse participants as 
was shown by Loukas, Rudolf, and Matthias (2012). Nonetheless, we 
must acknowledge that other effects might have influenced the children’s 
behavior. One possibility is that the participants’ gender might have 
impacted on how teenagers played. Also, despite the original design 
comparing behavior in two competitive environments, children’s desire 
to fight for status and reputation might have been different in both 
Treatments, against our assumptions.  
Further work should consider the influence of anonymity and 
reputation when strategic decisions are both of a competitive nature, as in 
the present work. Despite the fact that our experimental setting did not 
consider these effects (particularly for logistic reasons when dealing with 
children) we cannot deny that reputation effects could have occurred 
during the game. We also plan to repeat the study in different locations; 
the design could be extended by a post-game interview, shedding some 
light on the children’s thought processes during each game and 
ultimately the ontogeny of spiteful behavior in humans. 
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